Obama's Afghan War decision and lesser evilism

Let's face it, no matter what you think of the president's speech, and the war strategy it defends, the man did not have any good options. There are no ideal solutions to the mess W created in Afghanistan by pursuing the wrong strategy and all but leaving to go after one of Usama bin Ladin's greatest enemies in the Arab world, Saddam Hussein, for reasons still not very clear. The US has to get out of Afghanistan, sooner or later (hopefully sooner) but it also has to prevent al-Qa'ida making more attacks on the US and US embassies and citizens around the world. Let's just hope we can do both. As the president said in his speech:

I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards, and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. We must keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.

Let's see what chance President Obama's new strategy has of meeting American goals in the area.

The president is sending 30,000 more troops for 18 months. Limiting their tours, and by implication the US effort in Afghanistan, may be a mistake if it lets al-Qa'ida wait us out.

The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first part of 2010 -- the fastest possible pace -- so that they can target the insurgency and secure key population centers. They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight.

This is the surge strategy that seems to have worked so well in Iraq, but it overlooks some crucial differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, and it doesn't understand why Sunni insurgents switched sides in Iraq.

Iraq has a long secular tradition, and under its Ba'athist government was actively trying to de-emphasize, if not undermine, religious and sectarian differences. True, this was done in the name of a fanatical, arguably fascist form of Arab ultra-nationalism that committed atrocities, if not genocide, against the non-Arab Kurdish minority. But it did have the effect of dampening the enthusiasm for religious fanaticism, by which Iraq is almost surrounded, on the Wahhabi Saudi side and the Khomeiniac Iranian side. Many Sunnis sided with al-Qa'ida in Iraq (as the homegrown extremists renamed themselves after our invasion) only out of expedience, not because they were convinced the fanatics' analysis and theology was correct. When the insurgency proved itself to be a greater evil than the invaders, they (or many of them) gladly switched sides.

This doctrine of lesser evilism is important, for it is a cardinal principle of Islamic law, and must be understood in relation to our war in Afghanistan, as well as the war in Iraq. When confronted with two evils (as anyone often is), it is the moral duty of a good Muslim to choose the lesser evil. This is, of course, a slippery slope, but a reality that Barack Obama has also been faced with. In this case he must choose the lesser evil, just as the people of Afghanistan must. Just as we all must.

Afghanistan does not have the same secular tradition as Iraq. It is not as modern, and it does not have the same history of exposure to western ideas through colonialism. It's people may not decide that the Americans are a lesser evil than al-Qa'ida. Indeed, with their exposure so far to American patrols and to Arabic speaking al-Qa'ida preacher-militants in their villages, they may be far more inclined than Iraqis to convert to the al-Qa'ida doctrine of permanent aggressive jihad against the far enemy (AKA the Crusader-Zionist alliance). So Obama's surge strategy may not work out so well.

These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

This may or may not work, although there are serious problems with it. The aid strategy, the second core element, is likely to be met with suspicion if not outright hostility, and in any event would require more than 18 months for the US to implement. As for Pakistan, can we really be sure that they will not still target India with any military aid we give them? The government has moved against militants on the border, but the government itself has become unpopular, and one way or another may fall, probably to a coup d'etat. More and more Pakistanis are convinced that the suicide bombings in their country could not be carried out by Muslims, but instead of deciding that the suicide bombers are bad Muslims they decide that the bombings are really being carried out by Blackwater (now Xe) as black propaganda to discredit Muslims. If those whom the gods would destroy they first make mad, God must have decided to destroy Pakistan.

So there you have it. A dangerous and difficult gamble. I would have argued for more attention to bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida and less to the Taliban. You don't want to feed the apocalyptic fantasies of mountain peasants cut off from the world's mass media if you can help it. And you have to remember why we are in Afghanistan.

I'm sceptical, I'm doubtful, but I'm willing to go along with it.

Not that I have much choice.

I hope it works, but I fear it won't.

I hope the president has a good Plan B up his sleeve, just in case.